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Cultural Policies and Change: Mexico and Argentina after the Neoliberal Turn (1983–2012) 
Elodie Bordat-Chauvin 
Latin American Policy, issue 7.1.  
 
This article examines the changes that neoliberalism brought to the Mexican and Argentine 
cultural policies. Did the neoliberal turn of the 1980s and the deepening of the reforms in the 
1990s have the same effects in both countries? The findings of this article show that 
neoliberalism had a greater effect on cultural policy in Mexico because, since the Miguel de 
La Madrid administration in 1982, all governments have deepened neoliberal policies. On the 
other hand, in Argentina, where cultural policy is less institutionalized and more dependent on 
politics, neoliberalism had a major influence in the 1990s but less so since 2003 and Néstor 
Kirchner’s election. 
Este artículo analiza las consecuencias del neoliberalismo en las políticas culturales 
mexicanas y argentinas. ¿El giro neoliberal de la década de 1980 y la intensificación de las 
reformas en la década de 1990 han tenido los mismos efectos en los dos países? Las 
conclusiones de este artículo muestran que el neoliberalismo ha tenido mayor impacto en la 
política cultural de México porque desde el gobierno de Miguel de la Madrid en 1982, todos 
los gobiernos han intensificado las políticas neoliberales. Al contrario, en Argentina, donde la 
política cultural es menos institucionalizada y más dependiente de la política, el 
neoliberalismo tuvo más consecuencias en la década de 1900, pero menos a partir de 2003 y 
la elección de Néstor Kirchner. 
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Introduction 
A comparison of Mexico and Argentina provides an interesting case for understanding the 
changes that neoliberalism has brought to culture. These two countries have in common the 
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implementation in the 1990s of the most-drastic and orthodox monetarist reforms in Latin 
America, and were considered to be the two best pupils of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). They also share a common a history (both were Spanish colonies that became 
independent in 1810), and political and economic features (both are federal republics and 
presidential regimes and have bicameral congresses). They are members of the Group of 
Twenty (G-20), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and regional free-trade zones (the 
North American Free Trade Agreement—NAFTA—, and the Southern Common Market—
Mercosur). Finally, they share territorial characteristics, as they are the biggest countries in 
Latin America after Brazil. They also have differences that make the comparison heuristic. 
Mexico has a large indigenous population (6%, according to INEGI, 2014); and in Argentina 
the indigenous represent only 1% (INDEC, 2014), yet the country received 6 million 
foreigners between the end of the 19
th
 and the beginning of the 20
th
 centuries (Rouquié, 1978, 
p. 24). After the 2001 socioeconomic crisis, the Argentines elected on three occasions left-
wing governments that distanced themselves from the neoliberal policies implemented in the 
2000s. By contrast, in Mexico the governments of the National Action Party (PAN) deepened 
neoliberal reforms after they replaced the Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) in 2000. 
A cultural policy can be defined as, “the actions that a state […] take(s) that affect the cultural 
life of its citizens” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 267), and also “a moment of convergence and 
coherence between, on the one hand, representations of the role the state may allot to art and 
‘culture’ with regard to society and, on the other, the organization of a public action” 
(Urfalino, 2004, p. 13). Mexican and Argentine cultural policies share several characteristics.  
 1. Administrative level. Historically, the department dedicated to support culture has 
the same administrative-level secretariat of state, the Secretariat of Culture of the Nation in 
Argentina, and the National Council for Culture and Arts in Mexico.
i
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 2. Institutional framework. Both constitutions guarantee the right to culture; there are 
cinema, heritage, book, and reading laws. 
 3. Policy Instruments. There are national funds for arts (FNA in Argentina) and 
culture (FONCA in Mexico). 
These policies also have some differences. 
 1. Administrative belonging. The cultural sector was attached to education from 1921 
to 2015 in Mexico. In Argentina, culture was attached to the presidency, education, and 
justice and linked to communication, sport, or tourism—depending on the government in 
power—until 2014. 
 2. Budget. The budgets have been historically higher in Mexico than in Argentina, as 
the article will show. 
This article argues that neoliberalism has brought changes to the Mexican and Argentine 
cultural policies. Neoliberalism is understood as the sum of theories that have renewed liberal 
economic thinking since the end of the 1930s. These theories criticize state interventionism, 
which tends to limit the market and individual freedom and to cause a slowdown in economic 
development (Nay, 2011). Neoliberalism is at once a dominant economic theory, a political 
ideology, a public-policy philosophy, and a set of beliefs and mental representations (Hall & 
Lamont, 2013). It is “A vague idea, a belief in the efficacy of the market, which reincarnates 
itself in different ways according to the political processes and the public policy sector 
analyzed” (Crespy & Ravinet , 2014). If neoliberalism has brought change to the cultural 
policies studied here, can it be said that the scope of these changes is similar? This article will 
show that neoliberalism had a greater effect on cultural policy in Mexico because, since the de 
La Madrid administration in 1982, all governments have deepened neoliberal policies. On the 
other hand, in Argentina, as cultural policy is less institutionalized
ii
 and more dependent on 
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politics, neoliberalism had major influence during the Menem administration (1989–99) but 
less so during the Alfonsín (1983–89) and Kirchner (2003–12) administrations.  
Mexico and Argentina’s governments reduced the scope of their cultural administration and 
transferred competencies to the private sector through public–private partnerships. These 
changes led to transformations in the cultural policies’ main objectives, or “philosophy of 
action” (Urfalino, 2004), but in Mexico cultural policy has known more drastic changes. 
NAFTA induced deeper transformations in the Mexican cultural sector than did Mercosur in 
Argentina. Also, decentralization policies in Mexico have gone further, and the philosophy of 
action of “culture as an economic resource” has been dominant since the 1990s. This article 
shows that in Argentina a new philosophy of action appeared during Néstor Kirchner’s 
government in 2003.  
 
Accounting for Change in Public and Cultural Policies 
Instead of explaining their transformation, scholars who study cultural policies are more 
inclined to describe models or trajectories (Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, 1989), to 
analyze institutionalization processes (Dubois & Négrier, 1999), or to describe current 
cultural policies through their genesis (Dubois, 1999). The few works dealing with the 
phenomena of change in cultural policy (Mulcahy, 1995; Paquette & Redaelli, 2015; Gray, 
2000) do not use the literature on public-policy change or are based on sectoral cultural 
policies, such as Surel (1997), on the book policy in France; Parker and Parenta (2009), on the 
cinema policy in Australia; and Shockley and McNeely (2009), on the art policy in the United 
States. Even though recent works attempt to fill this gap in the literature (Bordat-Chauvin & 
Teillet, 2014; Barbieri, 2014), cultural policies are still unmapped territories for scholars 
working on public-policy changes. Gattinger and Saint-Pierre (2010) explore the 
consequences of the neoliberal turn in Canada by comparing two provincial cultural policies 
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and conclude that Ontario and Quebec have “progressively grafted economic market-based 
objectives into their existing policy frameworks.” This article will show that the Mexican and 
Argentine policies present similar factors.  
The literature on public-policy change shows that political scientists have studied the 
mechanisms of inertia and path dependence (Pierson, 2004) more than the transformation 
processes (Capano & Howlett, 2009). According to Zimmer and Toepler (1996), cultural 
policies are particularly marked by inertia. Learning costs are very high in this sector, so 
changes are rare and are often considered marginal accidents that result from exogenous 
shocks, such as economic crises (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991). According to Thelen (2003), 
elements of inertia are mixed with elements of change that allow institutions to be compatible 
with the changing economic, political, and social contexts. If exogenous shocks can explain 
changes to public policies, little endogenous changes matter too. Even if they seem marginal 
or invisible, they can lead to important transformations by effect of accumulation (Mahoney 
& Thelen, 2010). This article argues that institutional change can be understood only by 
taking socioeconomic and political context and its characteristics into account, and that the 
degree of institutionalization of policies explains the permeability of the policy to major or 
minor political changes. 
 
Similar Changes that Neoliberalism Has Brought to the Cultural Policies 
In the neoliberal ideology, government should be small, and the private sector and civil 
society should have a greater involvement in programs. Mexican and Argentine governments 
reduced the scope of the cultural public sector and transferred competences to the private 
sector. These kinds of changes have contributed to transform the “philosophies of action”
iii
 of 
both cultural policies. 
Reducing Administration and Budget in Culture  
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In both countries, New Public Management methods were implemented that induced 
budgetary rationalizations and suppressions of administrative structures and of public 
positions. These managerial discourses were coupled with the discourse of “good 
governance.” In this perspective, reducing administrative burden allows for more-efficient 
and less-expensive policies and proximity with users. In Argentina, the cultural 
administrations were reduced from the 1990s to the mid-2000s. The Secretariat for Culture, 
which includes Communication since 1987, became an Under-Secretariat for Culture in 1993. 
On several occasions, the organization lost under-secretariats, going from three (for culture, 
communication, and coordination), to one (1999), or two (2001). Several national directions 
were suppressed or merged. National institutions, such as the National Commission for 
Museum, Monuments and Historic Places, became administrative delegations, functioning 
with the administrative autarchy principle, which implies that they depend on the Secretariat 
for Culture but have their own estate (made up of donations, legacies, and public funds). 
Other institutions—such as the Cervantes National Theatre, the National Library, and the 
Commission for the Protection of Popular Libraries—increased their managerial and financial 
autonomy, which, as Secretary of Culture Pacho O’Donnell explained, enabled them “to have 
freedom in managing resources, giving them the possibility of signing partnership agreements 
and raising funds” (P. O’Donnell, personal communication, July 6, 2010). As neoliberal 
policies were deepened or economic crises arose, the cultural administration was reduced. 
In Mexico, since the creation of the National Council for Culture and Art (CONACULTA) in 
1988, during Carlos Salinas’ government, there has been a multiplication of departments and 
cultural organizations. This president looked for the support of the artists and intellectuals, 
since his election led to questions about his legitimacy in power (Bordat, 2013). From 2000, 
and especially from 2006 to 2012, PAN governments suppressed several cultural services. For 
instance, during Vicente Fox’s government (2000–06), five departments were suppressed,
iv
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and others lost their level in the hierarchy.
v
 During Felipe Calderón’s government (2006–12), 
12 departments and coordinations passed to a lower administrative level,
vi
 as the analysis of 
the documents of the Federal Regulatory Improvement Commission (COFEMER) shows 
(COFEMER, n.d.). As with the administration, the budgets were reduced in the 1990s. 
Between 1989 and 2009, Argentina assigned between 0.20 and 0.31% of the state budget to 
this sector. In 2001, budgets were reduced by 90%. In Mexico, cultural budgets were higher. 
The part of the national budget fluctuated between 0.48 and 0.88% during the same period 
and reached its lowest in 1994,
vii
 during the “tequila effect” crisis. Budget cuts led to a 
decrease of state-funded activities. To continue their actions, public organizations turned to 
the private sector to fund projects or infrastructure works. 
Public–private Partnership in Culture  
The injunction to downsize the state and its attributions is based on the belief that action is 
more rational, efficient, and effective in the private sector. For this reason, since the early 
1990s, Mexican and Argentine governments called for more participation from companies, 
foundations, and associations to fund cultural policy, especially in the cultural heritage sector. 
Mark Schuster (1997) warns against hasty generalizations about the meaning of the term 
“privatization” in the cultural sector, in particular concerning public–private partnerships. He 
asserts that the public–private dichotomy has blurred boundaries. That is why, in the realm of 
implementation and funding, it is often a question of mixed systems. Partnerships with 
companies are not always synonymous with privatization. For example, museums may 
delegate rubbish collection to firms subcontracted by the state. Moreover, even in museums 
that need no public funding the state intervenes in its role of guarantor of the law to ensure 
that contracts are fulfilled and consumer and workers’ rights respected, or to regulate the 
activities of non-profit-making organizations.  
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The Mexican governments encouraged private-sector participation in the development of 
tourism, based on the importance of the participation of civil society in heritage 
administration and the need to reduce public expenditure. Through “public policy 
instruments” (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007) such as concessions, private companies are now 
in charge of the regional development of culture and tourism. For instance, the administration 
and tourism development of Xcaret, an ecological and archeological site in the state of 
Quintana Roo, has been given to a private company. The agreement set in 1994 states that 
land where there are vestiges and exits to public roads remains under CONACULTA 
authority, and the company will deposit a low percentage of tickets sales for the next 25 years. 
In Argentina, public funds for museums were so low in the 1990s and 2000s that represented 
only enough to pay salaries (A. Castilla, Museum and Heritage Director, personal 
communication, June 2, 2010). Museum directors had to settle agreements with companies 
and trade private visits of museums or loans of paintings to pay for renovations. 
The application of neoliberal policies led to public budget cuts and the development of new 
strategies and instruments to gather non-public funds, and to the inclusion of private actors in 
the cultural policy making. These changes also induced modifications in the main objectives 
of the policies.  
From “Democratization of Culture” to “Culture as an Economic Resource”  
The documents published by cultural institutions (plans, reports, and discourses),
viii
 public 
statements, and interviews with secretaries of culture allow for evaluations of the 
transformations in the cognitive framework, the objectives and definitions of the cultural 
policy. In both countries, the “democratization of culture” philosophy—that is to bring high 
culture, art, and artists to individuals who are not used to it—was the main philosophy during 
the Alfonsín administration and at the beginning of the Salinas government. When neoliberal 
policies deepened, a new philosophy appeared, “culture as an economic resource.” In this new 
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philosophy, investments in culture have to generate employment and currencies and 
participate in the economic development. 
According to the main objectives and missions of the Argentine cultural policy during the 
Alfonsín government, the philosophy of action was “cultural democratization” (see Table 1).  
With the support of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), Secretary Marcos Aguinis (1986–87) implemented a program called National 
Program for the Democratization of Culture (PRONDEC). Its objective was to fight against 
authoritarianism in Argentina’s society through culture. When Carlos Menem was President 
(1989–99), “democratization of culture” was no longer the only philosophy of action. 
“Culture as an economic resource” became increasingly dominant. The notions of “culture” 
and “economy” were closely linked, as this quote from the Federal Plan for Culture, published 
in 1990, shows. “[Culture] is a sort of web that connect economic, political and social 
domains” (Secretaría de Cultura, 1990). Culture is understood as creation, production, and 
merchandise. Art is no longer considered solely as carrying meaning; it is also a production, 
in the sense that culture creates and puts goods into circulation. The authors of the Plan 
underlined that, “culture should not passively wait for economic development […] in order to 
benefit from it. [Culture] must participate in order to meet the market demands” (Secretaría de 
Cultura, 1990, p. 22). According to Secretary O’Donnell,
ix
 the free and massive outdoor 
concerts that he often organized in Buenos Aires contributed to “strengthen the social link” 
and democratize the access of culture, because “it includes everybody” (personal 
communication, June 7, 2010, Buenos Aires). All of the Secretariat for Culture’s 
communication was oriented toward the consumption of culture. In an institutional 
advertising campaign, Argentines were invited to read and therefore buy books, to see art 
exhibitions and then buy art pieces, and so on. The role of culture as a symbolic creator was 
left aside for its entertaining and economic role. Secretary Pacho O’Donnell (personal 
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communication, July 6, 2010) underlined that cultural public organizations must sign 
partnerships with the private sector and make the Argentines pay for cultural services to 
maintain their activities and overcome the economic crisis. “Culture, he declared, should learn 
lobbying and stop complaining, and learn to negotiate” (Clarín, 1997). 
In Mexico, when V. Flores Olea was at the head of CONACULTA (1988–92), the 
“objectives” of the cultural policy were clearly linked to the democratization of culture 
philosophy, as is shown in Table 2. 
When V. Flores Olea was evicted in 1992 and replaced by Rafael Tovar y de Teresa, the 
philosophy of action continued to be the democratization of culture, as several programs 
dedicated to the diffusion of heritage, art, and popular or indigenous culture show 
(CONACULTA, 1990, 1995), but a new philosophy progressively appeared, “culture as an 
economic resource.” It did not replace the democratization of culture but rather the two 
coexisted. In 1992, R. Tovar highlighted the fact that touristic promotion of heritage was 
important and that the archeological zones needed to be reinforced as generators of resources. 
He stressed that, to achieve this, the participation of the private sector and local government 
in its defense and preservation was decisive (Proceso, 1992; Tovar y de Teresa, 1994). A 
replacement of a political leader can be seen as a marginal factor of change, but change in 
decision makers can induce important transformations in public policy because the 
administration takes part in decisions and has leeway in their implementation (Geddes, 1994).  
This situation is even stronger in Mexico and Argentina, where there is a pyramidal “system 
of patronage” (Grindle, 2012) in public administrations that allows decision makers to ensure 
their subordinates’ loyalty, as they can dismiss them at any moment. These changes have even 
more consequences when the organization’s missions are not strongly and clearly defined 
(Selznick, 1957). Furthermore, these actors are part of the definition and construction of the 
organizations’ identities, thanks to their capacity to appoint their teams. Replacing 
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administrative managers means replacing the agents authorized to talk about cultural policy 
and the way of talking about it. With President Zedillo (1995–2000), the “culture as an 
economic resource” philosophy became more important. In his Development Plan he stated 
that it was necessary to “encourage the contribution of the private sector” in support of the 
creation and diffusion of cultural products. Thanks to “the updating of cultural institutions’ 
legal framework, social participation in the funding, planning and carrying out of projects for 
the conservation, promotion and diffusion of culture will be strengthened” (Presidencia de la 
República, 1995). 
Mexico and Argentina’s cultural policies have seen similar changes—a decrease in cultural 
budgets, suppressions of organizations, and an increasing participation of the private sector. 
These changes induce the emergence of a new philosophy of action—culture as an economic 
resource—that challenges the preexisting one, the democratization of culture. Exogenous 
factors have induced these changes (i.e. macroeconomic policies), but so have small 
endogenous changes (the appointment of new decision makers to head the cultural policies). 
 
Intermittent Changes in Argentina, Deeper Changes in Mexico  
Despite the political alternation in 2000, there has been no shift in the Mexican economic 
policy. Rather the two right-wing governments of the PAN (2000–12) deepened neoliberal 
policies. Culture as an economic resource started to replace democratization of culture as the 
main philosophy of action. In Argentina on the contrary, the election of a left-wing 
government in 2003 led to the replacement of this philosophy for one of “social inclusion and 
citizenship.” In addition to these differences, the instruments used to implement the objective 
of decentralization are different, and so are the consequences of regional free-trade 
agreements.  
Consequences of NAFTA and Mercosur for Cinema and Heritage  
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Exogenous factors of change do not always induce important policy transformations in all 
sectors and contexts. NAFTA led to significant changes in the Mexican cultural policy, 
especially in the cinema sector. In contrast, as the Mercosur agreement tolerates measures 
such as broadcasting quotas, the cinema policy did not suffer major changes. The changes in 
the Argentine cultural policy are to be found in the heritage sector, most affected by free-trade 
agreements. 
One consequence of NAFTA is that Mexico has to take into account the institutional 
framework of the agreement and negotiate with multiple new actors, especially transnational 
actors, as it implements its public policies. During the negotiations with Canada and the 
United States, Mexico amended its legislation to prevent norms considered as protectionist by 
its partners from impeding the signature. This fact is visible particularly in the cinema sector. 
In the cinema law adopted in 1992, the quota for the transmission of national productions was 
reduced from 50% to 10%. When NAFTA came into effect, the original measure could not be 
respected, as it violated the principle of free competition, the agreement’s cornerstone. From 
then on, Mexican film production has decreased significantly. There were 104 productions in 
1990, 14 in 1995, and only 9 in 1997. Approximately 90% of the movies broadcast in Mexico 
come from the United States (García Canclini & Piedras Feria, 2006, p. 28). To face this 
crisis, the Mexican movie industry began mobilizing and lobbying to encourage Congress to 
adopt a new instrument that could support the production and distribution of Mexican films. 
In 2002, a fund was created, financed by taxes on movie tickets (1 peso on each ticket, 
approximately 2% of the ticket price). It is known as “peso en taquilla” [peso in shop 
window]. Considering the earning foregone, the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA), which includes the most-influential actors of the movie industry, demanded the 
annulment of this measure, considered protectionist, in January 2003. The MPAA’s 
representative for Latin America advocated to the Mexican Supreme Court that this measure 
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was unconstitutional, as it went against free trade. The Supreme Court repealed the peso en 
taquilla measure in 2004. This example shows that NAFTA has widely reduced the Mexican 
state’s leeway to regulate this sector and that the socioeconomic context matters to explain 
policy changes. 
Mercosur has not led to this kind of change in Argentine cultural policy, first because the 
liberalization of some cultural sectors and the opening to foreign investments predate the 
signature of the Asunción treaty.
x
 In this case few endogenous changes (progressive 
liberalization of several sectors) led by accumulation to more-important policy changes. 
Second, Mercosur allows countries to adopt measures that NAFTA forbids, such as quotas for 
broadcasting national productions or funds for the movie industry financed by a tax on movie 
tickets.
xi
 Still, Mercosur led to other types of changes with the creation of new instruments, 
the “cultural Mercosur” label, which facilitates the circulation of cultural goods; Cultural 
Information System of Mercosur (SICSUR);
xii
 the fund of cultural, Mercosur,
xiii
 and recently, 
the Cultural Industries Market of the South (MICSUR).
xiv
 Mercosur also promotes the 
emergence of new actors, such as the Cultural Parliament of Mercosur (PARCUM).
xv
 
Mercosur fosters the formulation of new objectives (circulation of artistic works and artists, 
cooperation agreements in cultural sectors) and new programs, such as the Inca Trail (Qhapac 
Ñán).
xvi
 Thus, Mercour has had several effects on cultural policy, new public instruments, 
actors, and cognitive frameworks, even if at first glance they seem less visible than in the case 
of Mexico and NAFTA. 
Implementing Decentralization  
Decentralization is an objective in both cultural policies, but it has not been implemented with 
the same kind of instruments
xvii
. Decentralization has become one of the main goals in the 
cultural policy objectives and missions of both countries since the 1990s because even though 
they are federations, Mexico and Argentina are countries where power is highly centralized, 
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and sub-national governments have no formal competencies in culture. Furthermore, 
decentralization is one of the recipes that neoliberalism promotes to downsize the state. 
Finally, UNESCO recommends decentralizing cultural policy to deepen democracy at a local 
level. In Mexico, decentralization is considered an instrument that provides cultural goods and 
services for the whole country (CONACULTA, 1994, p. 17). Secretary R. Tovar y de Teresa 
(1994) underlines that the state has “to preserve the mosaic of regional and local creation” 
thanks to decentralization policies (p. 75). During Vicente Fox’s government (2000–06), 
decentralization became a synonym of citizen participation. In Argentina, decentralization is 
understood as reparation. According to the Federal Plan of Culture of 1990, Buenos Aires and 
other big cities would have captured Argentina’s economic resources and imposed a way of 
life and development on the rest of the country (Secretaría de Cultura, 1990, p. 19). 
Decentralization allowed them to reverse this situation. It could be possible if every national 
institution of culture had a representative from each province. As in Mexico, Argentina’s 
decentralization has been operationalized through changes in the relationship between actors 
and the adoption of new instruments. 
Since the early 1990s, Mexico’s public authorities have created institutions to transfer 
resources from the federation to the states and encourage coordination between both levels of 
government; these are the regional units of culture. Furthermore, CONACULTA supports 
regional cultural infrastructures co-managed and co-funded by state governments, artists, and 
artistic associations of states called mixed funds. It is what P. Moulinier calls a “civic 
decentralization,” that is “the gift of cultural and social responsibilities to people involved” 
(2002, p. 14) to give minorities the right to express themselves. In the 2000s, “municipal 
funds for culture” were created that are “economic, conventional and incentive instruments,” 
as they rely on mechanisms of participative democracy and aim at deepening participation at 
every level of government (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2011, p. 101). Each fund includes a 
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‘Citizens’ Community’ that includes representatives from each sector of civil society and the 
local cultural community (CONACULTA, 1995, p. 38) to “collaborate” in the planning of the 
national cultural policy. 
In Argentina, there are no economic or financial instruments like those observed in Mexico. 
National budgets are much lower and cannot allow for these kinds of funding. The objective 
of decentralization is implemented through the creation of several institutions at which 
national and federal authorities are invited to discuss. The first consultation of provinces 
about culture happened shortly after the return of democracy, in 1984, as artists, playwrights, 
and writers, named at the head of the Secretariat of Culture, wanted their proposals for the 
cultural policy to reach a consensus. Other spaces of participation and dialogue were created 
in the 2000s. The De La Rúa government (1999–2001) created a “federal consultative 
committee” to gather regional representatives of culture, appointed by peers. During Cristina 
Fernández de Kichner’s mandate (2007–11), the federal committee of Culture created in 1979 
was put into operation. Since 2006, the Argentine Congress of Culture is organized every two 
years and brings together many actors from the cultural sector to share experiences and 
express demands regarding the cultural policy. The creation of these institutions, spaces of 
dialogue, and representations of provinces allowed relationships between federal and 
provincial institutions of cultural policy to change. 
Despite an increasing number of instruments and spaces of participation for Argentine 
provinces and Mexican states, one cannot talk about “political and administrative cultural 
decentralization” (Moulinier, 2002), as CONACULTA and the Secretariat of Culture delegate 
only a few competencies to sub-national cultural institutions. Funds were created in Mexico, 
and new spaces of dialogue were created in Argentina. The same objective, decentralization, 
was not implemented with the same instruments. 
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A New Philosophy of Action 
Political alternations and small endogenous changes led to changes in the philosophies of 
action. In Mexico, “culture as an economic resource” became progressively dominant. In 
Argentina, after the political alternation of 2003, “social inclusion and citizenship” replaced 
it.   
During Secretary Sari Bermúdez's time in office (2000–06), there was tension between the 
democratization-of-culture and culture-as-an-economic-resource philosophies of action, as the 
“principles” of the cultural policy in Table 3 show.  
The equal access to cultural goods and services and “balanced cultural development” clearly 
refers to the democratization of culture principles. The latter notion is explained in Vicente 
Fox’s Cultural program; “art and culture are part of everyone’s full development” 
(CONACULTA, 2001, p. 1), and “The government will support culture because of its 
intrinsic value as a privileged form to succeed to a development that includes political, 
economic and social freedom, to equal opportunities to education” (CONACULTA 2001, p 
22). As for the “citizenization” [ciudadanización] of public institutions, it is an expression 
from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) jargon and refers to the inclusion 
of citizens in public administrations. 
During Felipe Calderón’s government (2006–12), one single “principle” was presented, 
“balanced human development,” which meant “that all Mexicans have access to the 
participation and enjoyment of art and cultural heritage in this country as a part of their 
human development” (CONACULTA, 2007, p. 22). The transformation in the names and 
objectives in heritage departments shows that culture as an economic resource progressively 
became the main philosophy of action during the PAN governments. During the PRI 
governments, the first cultural program was “Preservation and Diffusion of National cultural 
Heritage.” S. Bermudez kept this program and created a new one, “Heritage and Tourism 
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development.” With Secretary Sergio Vela (2006–09), the mention of “preservation” of the 
first program was replaced by “Heritage and Cultural Diversity,” and the second became 
“Culture and Tourism.” Then the Heritage department started to include tourism. The 
representation of heritage changed from being a factor of identity to a factor of economic 
development. Finally, several programs were cancelled during Felipe Calderón’s government, 
diffusion of popular (indigenous) culture, decentralization and social link, and popular 
participation to cultural policy. The only direction created was for cultural industries. Minor 
changes, which might have seemed invisible, led to the consolidation of a change in the 
cultural policy philosophy; democratization of culture was progressively left aside, and 
culture as an economic resource became the only philosophy of action. 
When he arrived to the presidency, Néstor Kirchner made major changes to Argentina’s 
macroeconomic policy and took a large step back from neoliberal institutions, especially the 
IMF. Secretary Torcuato Di Tella (2003–04) conducted a cultural policy that aimed to 
develop the “social role of art” so that “deprived groups” had cultural activities. For instance, 
in the Palais des Glaces, an elite cultural venue, he organized an exhibition of piquetero and 
cartonero art.
xviii
 Culture was no longer considered an economic resource but a way of 
reconstructing social cohesion. Even the touristic-cultural policies were oriented toward the 
social use of heritage (Di Tella, 2003). He resigned in 2004 and was replaced by another 
sociologist, José Nún. Whereas Torcuato Di Tella stressed the importance of the industrial 
and productive nature of culture, José Nún believed there was a need to “consolidate national 
identity” and “give new value to the sense of belonging to the nation” (Jefatura de Gabinete, 
2007, p. 343), and that “the construction of citizenship” was a major issue. A new philosophy 
of action appeared, “social inclusion and citizenship.” Culture was then an “expediency” 
(Yúdice, 2003) to reconstruct a broken social fabric. This philosophy gave meaning and 
coherence to such diverse objectives as financing cultural projects of worker-controlled 
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factories [empresas recuperadas], booking distributions to social housing inhabitants, and 
promoting heritage protection or programs for indigenous populations aimed at modernizing 
and developing craft production. Art should help social inclusion, such as in the “community 
development program” that participated in the financing of cultural projects that “reinforce 
local identity, participation and regional work” (Jefatura de Gabinete, 2007 p. 354), or the 
Culture Nation Coffee program that allowed for dialogue and citizen debates and repaired the 
damaged social fabric (Jefatura de Gabinete, 2005, pp 35, 37). These different programs seek 
to link culture and identity with a socioeconomic activity, with work, and therefore with 
social inclusion. In Argentina, the political alternation led to a transformation of the 
philosophy of action because the policy was less institutionalized
xix
 and therefore more 
dependent on politics, but also because there had been a change in macroeconomic policies. 
In Mexico, as the general orientation of the policies continued to be neoliberal, there were no 
changes in the cultural policy philosophy of action. 
 
Conclusion 
Most Western countries have adopted similar main objectives influenced by the UNESCO 
reports—democratization of culture, growth of cultural industries, and professionalization of 
the cultural sector—and have given a growing role to the private sector, local governments, 
and international organizations. The philosophies of actions of Mexico and Argentina’s 
cultural policies are similar, and this article has underlined that they have also created new 
ones, “culture as an economic resource” and “social inclusion and citizenship.” The Kirchner 
administrations have taken a step back in the implementation of neoliberal policies, whereas 
the PAN governments in Mexico deepened these policies, so the consequences on cultural 
policies were different. In the 1990s, cultural budgets were low, several cultural institutions 
had to shut down, and cultural investments had to generate return on investments. In Mexico, 
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neoliberalism had broad changes since the 1990s, especially in cinema and heritage, because 
all four governments studied here implemented the same economic policy. The 
socioeconomic and political contexts are thus major factors in explaining cultural policy 
changes. This article has also underlined that changes that can be perceived as small, such as 
the dismissal of a leader in the administration, can have consequences when the 
organization’s missions are not strongly and clearly defined. In both countries, the arrival of 
new decision makers has led to a transformation in the philosophy of action of the cultural 
policies. 
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Notes 
                                                 
i
 They have had cabinet-level departments since 2014 in Argentina and 2015 since in Mexico. 
ii
 Murillo and Levistky (2010) have shown that Argentina is a weak institutional environment.  
iii
 A cultural policy philosophy of action corresponds to “a ‘problematisation’ or the way that this public policy is 
built and intellectually and practically grasped” (Urfalino, 2004, p. 14). 
iv
 The Department of Social Cohesion and Citizenization absorbed the National Coordinations for Regional 
Cultural Development, Cultural Activities and Cultural Development for Children (created in 1995). The 
National Commission on the Preservation of Cultural Heritage and the National Committee for Audiovisual 
Media (former unit of special projects) were suppressed. These changes took effect on the August 16, 2004. 
v
 National committees became simple departments included in the CONACULTA’s organizational chart (the 
Image Centre, Hellenic Cultural Centre, and the Mexican Library). 
vi
 The FONCA’s directorate general was transferred to the Secretariat of the Presidency, as was the Strategy and 
Prospective National Committee (which became the National Institutional Development Committee), and the 
Directorate General of Social Communication. The National Commission for the Preservation of Railway 
Heritage became part of the Directorate of Cultural Heritage Sites and Monuments. The Directorate of Cultural 
Cohesion was made dependent on the Cultural and Artistic Secretariat and absorbed the National Commission 
Cultural Heritage and Tourism, the National Commission Children’s Cultural Development, the National System 
of Musical Development, and the Commission on Support for Music. The Directorate of Culture and Tourism 
created by Vicente Fox lost its rank of directorate. The Directorate General of Administration absorbed the 
Commission on Innovation and Quality and the Directorate General of Work Relations. Finally, the Directorate 
General of the Hellenic Cultural Centre became part of the National Center for the Arts (CENART). 
vii
 Calculation realized on the basis of information obtained from the Ministerio de Economía (2007); Centro de 
Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas (2012); Presidencia de la República, (1998, p. 214), Presidencia de la 
República, (2000, p. 254), Presidencia de la República, (2012, p. 368). We wish to thank J. Ruíz Dueñas, C. 
Gimet, and J. Cabrera Delgado for their assistance in these calculations. 
viii
 Grey literature is made of the planning of action (National Plan of Culture edited every six years in Mexico 
but more randomly in Argentina), of reports (organization memoirs), and of discourses of organizations 
published in their official communications (brochures and Web sites). Finally, we have used presidential annual 
reports presented in Congress (much like the State of the Union address in the United States). 
ix
 F. O’Donnell did not publish a Plan. He rather gave interviews to the press and researchers to explain his 
policy.  
x
 Argentina did not ask for exemptions, contrary to its neighboring states Brazil, which excluded radio 
broadcasting services and telecommunications services; Paraguay, which excluded press, radio, and TV 
broadcasting medias; and Uruguay, which excluded telecommunications, radio, press, and audiovisual medias 
(Mercosur, 1991). 
xi
 The legislation regulating cinematographic industry is one of the most proactive on the continent in terms of 
incentives for production and diffusion, spectators for national films, and the number of awards received for 
movies at international festivals.  
xii
 Thanks to a satellite account, it evaluates the weight of culture in the economies of the continent and gathers 
information on member countries’ cultural sectors.  
xiii
 It finances creation, circulation, and promotion of cultural goods and services in the region.  
xiv
 It promotes the exchange of products of cultural industries.  
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xv
 It gathered members of the commissions of culture to create regional institutional frameworks allowing free 
circulation of cultural goods and services in the region and to organize legislators’ work. 
xvi
 It is a network of 23,000 paths crossing Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina. For the first 
time, countries jointly asked for the UNESCO cultural heritage of all mankind status. 
xvii
 For elements on the trajectories of decentralization processes and their outcomes in Argentina and Mexico 
see Falleti (2010). 
xviii
 Piqueteros comes from piquete (picket), to protest by standing or walking; these movements appeared during 
Carlos Menem’s first government. Cartoneros are kinds of rag-and-bone men who collected cardboard products 
to sell to firms for recycling. 
xix
 Even though budgets increased, a planning of the action was carried out, and an organization dedicated to 
culture existed, Argentine cultural policy was less institutionalized than in Mexico, which had a consolidated 
clientele around cultural organizations, a higher budget, and more political support during PRI administrations 
(Bordat-Chauvin, 2015). 
